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Abstract
The proliferation of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing proto-
cols is due to their efficient and scalable methods for data
dissemination to numerous users. But many of these net-
works have no provisions to provide users with long term
access to files after the initial interest has diminished, nor
are they able to guarantee protection for users from mali-
cious clients that wish to implicate them in incriminating
activities. As such, users may turn to supplementary mea-
sures for storing and transferring data in P2P systems. We
present a new file sharing paradigm, called a Graffiti Net-
work, which allows peers to harness the potentially unlim-
ited storage of the Internet as a third-party intermediary.
Our key contributions in this paper are (1) an overview of a
distributed system based on this new threat model and (2)
a measurement of its viability through a one-year deploy-
ment study using a popular web-publishing platform. The
results of this experiment motivate a discussion about the
challenges of mitigating this type of file sharing in a hos-
tile network environment and how web site operators can
protect their resources.
1 Introduction
In just a few years since its inception, the BitTorrent pro-
tocol and similar systems have become the predominant
P2P file sharing model [11]. But the recent activities of
those seeking to take down P2P infrastructures have forced
the file sharing community to adapt to a hostile environ-
ment [15]. Operators of global BitTorrent trackers now take
two notable measures in order to indemnify themselves
from legal action: (1) the trackers are located in countries
that are not party to international copyright treaties, and
(2) access to trackers is controlled by private, invite-only
communities with strict membership requirements [9]. The
former allows operators to ignore legal threats to shutdown
their services that a law-abiding ISP would normally have
to comply with. But this approach can be both prohibitively
expensive and difficult to arrange. Additionally, limiting
access to only privileged users only temporarily protects a
site that has been made private; it takes only a single sedi-
tious user to undermine the network and provide damaging
evidence to the right parties.
The aforementioned measures may protect tracker oper-
ators but they provide little protection to the average file
sharing user. This is because the fundamental principle of
the BitTorrent protocol is that users download and upload
data directly with other untrusted users, rather than down-
load from a single, central source [11]. Although some P2P
clients employ communication encryption and protocol ob-
fuscation enhancements, such measures do not protect a
user from malicious clients that harvest file sharing activ-
ity information for future litigation. Furthermore, it has
been shown that while it may not be possible to easily view
encrypted packet contents, a third-party observer can still
deduce that file sharing is occurring by identifying network
pairs based on a tracker’s public peer list [7, 15].
Another limitation of current BitTorrent-like models is
that the networks rely on altruistic users to keep files avail-
able for others. This is problematic in an environment
where users want to limit their exposure to any traffic log-
ging clients, and thus it is in their interest to disconnect
immediately once they have the successfully downloaded
their desired files. Content in these networks is unavail-
able once all of the peers that have the complete file depart.
Newly arriving clients may be able to download and share
some fraction of the data (if any is available), but they must
wait and hope that a client returns to the network with the
rest of file. Enhancements to private trackers, such as up-
load/download ratios, provide incentives for clients to con-
tinue to seed files [9], but these economic models are dif-
ficult to initiate and do little to maintain less popular older
files.
In response to the lack of user anonymity and long-term
data persistence in existing P2P systems, some users may
seek an alternative. But because traditional data hosting
solutions are not a viable option for sharing certain con-
tent that may have legal consequences, these users must
use more questionable means for sharing data. Motivated
by this, we developed the Graffiti Network distributed file
sharing protocol that uses multiple third-party storage sites
as a data replication and transfer medium between clients.
The Graffiti approach is to use publically available web
sites to store multiple copies of shared content. We use
the term graffiti for our work since we are storing data in a
way that non-network participants may regard as unsightly
or unwanted vandalism. Our approach presents several new
security challenges over other existing P2P systems where
clients transmit data directly with each other: (1) a newly
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arriving peer can still download files even if all other peers
have long disconnected, (2) a peer does not need to know
about the existence of other peers, and (3) a tracker does
not need multiple peers to enforce tit-for-tat policies [11].
The layout of this paper is as follows. First, we provide
an overview of the Graffiti Network file sharing model. We
then discuss our experimental prototype of the Graffiti Net-
work model that is integrated with a BitTorrent system. The
results from our one-year study on the efficacy of our proto-
type in a real-world deployment show that the use of public
storage sites in a file sharing system is possible. We then
conclude with a discussion about how both administrators
and software developers can guard against such a threat.
2 Related Work
We motivate our work by first discussing the related back-
ground research and literature.
2.1 BitTorrent
The BitTorrent protocol defines the operations of a P2P net-
work that facilitates the efficient sharing of files in a dis-
tributed manner [11]. Our model inherits many of the fea-
tures of BitTorrent, but employs third-party storage sites
as an intermediary for data transfers, rather than allowing
clients to directly download files from each other. This in-
direction makes it difficult to discover the identities of users
that are participating in a Graffiti Network.
The overall efficiency and throughput of BitTorrent sys-
tems has been shown to scale gracefully to accommodate
many users arriving at the same time to download new and
popular files [27]. But while the model works well in the
short term, it does not ensure the long term availability of
esoteric content or files that become less popular over time.
This problem is especially prevalent for content that is re-
leased in “episodes”: new content is shared profusely when
it is released, but the number of peers decreases as the file
becomes older and newer episodes are released. In a five
month study of BitTorrent network activity, it was shown
that the average time that a client stays in the network to
continue sharing a file after it has received the entire file
set was only seven hours [19]. These results, however, are
based on the sharing activity of copyright-free files, and
therefore the clients do not have a vested interest in dis-
connecting immediately. In contrast, a study [25] explic-
itly focused on illegal file sharing activity showed that the
departure rate of peers is much faster than previously as-
sumed in [27]. The results in [16] show that the average
availability of a torrent is less than nine days and that most
swarms completely die out in only 13 days. Thus, without
the incentives for sharing found in private communities [9],
most BitTorrent content becomes unavailable after just a
short amount of time. To overcome the capricious nature
of users, Graffiti Networks use storage sites that have the
potential to always be available, and thus the shared files
are still accessible after the initial interest in the content
has subsided. With enough replication, enforced by a strict
asynchronous tit-for-tat model, we believe that a Graffiti
Network could provide clients with access to files months
or years after it was first introduced to the Internet.
2.2 Peer-to-Peer Storage Systems
Much of the previous work on developing P2P storage
systems that provide block storage across multiple nodes
is based on distributed hash tables [12, 22, 29]. These
approaches have the same deficiencies as the BitTorrent
model: peers download file blocks directly from other
peers, thereby losing anonymity, and the systems do not
provide mechanisms to provide long term availability for
less popular files after peers disconnect from the network.
Other systems are focused on providing anonymous and
secure P2P data storage [32]. The POTSHARDS system
provides secure long-term data storage when the content
originator no longer exists using secret splitting and data re-
construction techniques to handle partial losses [30]; their
approach assumes multiple, semi-reliable storage backends
that are willing to host a client’s data. The Freenet anony-
mous storage system uses key-based routing to locate files
stored on remote peers [10]. As discussed in [12], Freenet’s
anonymity limits both its reliability and performance: files
are not associated with any predictable server, and thus un-
popular content may disappear since no one is responsible
for maintaining replicas.
2.3 Steganographic Storage Systems
Although the Graffiti Network model is not a pure
steganographic-based storage system, it does share sim-
ilar properties of this class of systems [18, 17]. The
Mnemosyne storage service applies the steganography
techniques from a local storage system [8] to a distributed
hash table [17]. The StegVault proposal uses secret sharing
to build a secure P2P storage system on top of reliable mul-
ticast [18]. One key benefit of these systems is that users
have plausible deniability of the existence of hidden data
because it is concealed inside covering data [6].
2.4 Alternative Storage Sites
Since the Graffiti Network model relies on gaining access
to and the circumvention of third-party storage sites to host
content, we consider the alternative approach of using ded-
icated storage services that are explicitly designed for the
storage and transfer of large files. The Amazon Simple
Storage Service provides a well-defined API for writing ar-
bitrary data files, but it currently charges for both the stor-
age space an account uses as well as the network band-
width used to transfer data [1]. The Gmail Filesystem en-
ables Google email accounts to be used as a network stor-
age medium, but adopting approach would require users to
share account information [20]. The Usenet news service is
another potential storage system, but servers often impose
a message retention time and many ISPs have discontinued
providing this service to customers for free.
Free web-based file-hosting sites also do not provide the
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Figure 1: For a given a fileset, the client communicates with the tracker in the following manner: (1) the client sends the tracker the list
of pieces it already has; (2) the tracker responds a list of instructions on where the client should download a sub-piece and the location
of where to upload a replica; (3) after downloading the new sub-piece, the client then navigates the target storage site and uploads a
new encrypted and encoded sub-piece payload; (4) the storage site returns an HTML page and the client verifies that the upload was
successful. This process repeats until the client has all the pieces of the fileset and has produced enough replicas for the tracker.
robustness that we seek in our file sharing model [4]. One
limitation of these sites is that large files are broken into
separate downloads and users must wait for some time pe-
riod before they are allowed to retrieve the next piece. Fur-
thermore, the user must manually enter each segment URL
into their browser and repeatedly pass human-validation
tests [24]. These free hosting sites are also under scrutiny
because many of their users post illegal content, and thus
the site operators streamline the removal process for files
and the disclosure of offending users’ information for copy-
right holders in order to quickly diffuse any legal action that
may disrupt the hosting site’s revenue stream. Despite this,
it is possible to include file-hosting sites as just one of the
many options available in a Graffiti Network deployment
(see Section 3.3).
Lastly, another proposed solution is to create a highly-
volatile storage site by sending data packets to unsuspect-
ing network entities to leverage network latency as a type
of durability [26]. The idea is to continuously send data to
targets that relay the same data back to the source, there-
fore two copies of the data are always theoretically avail-
able. This approach is not practical for the Graffiti Net-
work model because it does not allow the data to be shared
amongst multiple peers. Furthermore, it requires that the
original data source remain online in order to keep cycling
the packets back out over the wire.
3 Graffiti Network Model
We now describe how a file-sharing system based on the
Graffiti Network model would operate. We discuss various
measures and techniques that ensure the system is stable,
usable, and scalable. Such qualities are necessary to fa-
cilitate wide-spread adoption by file-sharing participants,
thereby making the threat a real possibility.
To describe the Graffiti model, we adopt the terminol-
ogy of the BitTorrent protocol [11]. We define a fileset as
a set of one or more files that peers wish to share. The
fileset’s data is divided into multiple fixed-length pieces
of n bytes (the last piece can contain less than n bytes)
and are numbered sequentially. Each piece is divided fur-
ther into fixed-length sub-pieces. A Graffiti Network that
is deployed to distribute these pieces is comprised of three
distinct components: (1) a tracker coordinates the replica-
tion and sharing procedures of a fileset, (2) a client down-
loads and replicates the fileset data managed by the tracker,
and (3) third-party storage sites store and provide access to
fileset data for peers. Any client that wishes to download
and reconstruct the original fileset is required by the tracker
to produce multiple sub-piece replicas on as many storage
sites as possible.
A high-level overview of the Graffiti Network protocol
is shown in Figure 1. To connect to the Graffiti Network,
the client first announces itself to the tracker and provides it
with a list of all the pieces that the peer has already down-
loaded. The tracker responds with a series of sub-piece re-
quest pairs for a new piece that the client is missing. Each
request pair consists of (1) a download location where the
peer can retrieve a sub-piece and (2) instructions to produce
a new replica on a different storage site for the data it just
downloaded. Graffiti trackers follow a strict tit-for-tat pro-
tocol: for each sub-piece that a peer downloads, that peer is
required to generate a replica for a previously downloaded
sub-piece on a different storage site and send the location
of this new replica back to the tracker before it can receive
the next piece.
3.1 Central Tracker
The tracker provides a directory service for peers to retrieve
a fileset. For each piece of data in a fileset, the tracker main-
tains a table of the sub-piece replica locations on sites that
were generated by clients. Each replica is annotated with
three pieces of meta-data: (1) a unique encryption key for
that replica, (2) a checksum for each sub-piece, and (3) the
first and last byte sequences of the encrypted data block on
the storage site. The tracker uses a different encryption key
per entry to ensure that each replica is stored as a unique
character sequence to prevent the use of tools to discover
other replicas. The checksum and sequence markers also
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allow peers to determine whether a replica has the proper
byte sequence and to locate data boundaries at the storage
site location.
For each connected peer, the tracker maintains an ac-
tive piece set (APS) of download/upload replica pairs that
are unfulfilled requests for a client. Each pair consists of
a sub-piece identifier that the tracker provided for client to
download and a storage site location where the tracker in-
structed the client to make a new replica. Once the client
provides the tracker with information about a new replica
for a download/upload pair, the entry is removed from that
client’s APS and the client is allowed to receive new infor-
mation. The size of the APS is determined by the tracker’s
administrator and prevents a client for downloading too
many sub-pieces without producing any new replicas. As in
the BitTorrent protocol, the Graffiti tracker strives for uni-
form availability of all data pieces [11]. Since the tracker
decrees what pieces the clients must replicate for each re-
quest in the APS, it can decide to replicate the “rarest”
pieces first.
Malicious clients in Graffiti Networks are quite differ-
ent than malicious clients in BitTorrent networks [23]. A
rogue Graffiti client may have other ulterior goals: (1) to
discover all of the storage site locations used by a tracker
in order to contact site administrators and have the replica
data removed or (2) to falsely identify valid storage sites
and replica locations as invalid in an attempt to disrupt op-
erations. In the first case of trying to discover all of a file-
set’s replicas, the tracker can use throttling measures to pre-
vent a client from learning too much in a short amount of
time. But for the latter problem, the tracker should not ac-
tively check whether a client actually uploaded the data at
the location it claims it did, due to security and economic
reasons. Instead it can employ proxies or other third-party
entities to determine whether a client is behaving properly.
For example, the tracker can retrieve a page through the
Coral Cache or Tor services to determine if the data was
stored at the location claimed by a client [14, 13].
3.2 Client
A Graffiti client allows a user to automatically download a
fileset stored on one or more storage sites. A user must first
obtain a metadata file for a specific fileset uniquely identi-
fied by an “info hash” in order to begin downloading [11].
After the client first announces itself to the tracker at the
address listed in the metadata file, the tracker places the
peer in an “initialization” mode. This is always done re-
gardless of whether the client is connecting for the first time
or if it is returning with some pieces already downloaded.
The tracker sends every new client the same initial piece
set (IPS) that will use for the first phase of downloading
and replication. This initial set is the same for all clients ar-
riving within a certain time period to prevent a client from
initiating multiple new connections without ever creating
new replicas. The size of the initial set is the same size as
the APS and its information is changed to a different ran-
dom set of sub-pieces at regular intervals (e.g., hours or
days, rather than minutes). Thus, it is possible for a rogue
client to retrieve a complete fileset without ever producing
a new replica for the network, but it would take several days
or weeks to cycle through all of the tracker’s IPS combina-
tions if there were a significantly large number of pieces.
The client is required to also produce two new replicas for
each sub-piece in the IPS, even if the client has already
downloaded the pieces previously. This policy is akin to a
new tenant paying “last month’s rent” before moving into
an apartment: it ensures that client cannot disconnect from
the network without creating new replicas for each piece
that it downloads.
Once the client successfully downloads and generates
sufficient replicas for its IPS, it leaves the initialization
phase and is then allowed to receive arbitrary pieces. The
protocol works the same before: the tracker maintains an
APS for each client and only gives new download locations
once that particular client has produced a new replica on a
storage site.
3.3 Storage Sites
A potential Graffiti storage site is any accessible network
entity that allows for data to be stored and retrieved using
a known network protocol. In practice, peers will likely
use publically available web sites that provide services that
Graffiti clients repurpose to store arbitrary blocks of data.
This approach has the distinction that all data movement
appears as normal HTTP traffic, and thus is immune to cur-
rent ISP throttling and tracking techniques [15].
The ideal storage site for a Graffiti Network is one that
allows for anyone to post data without CAPTCHA pro-
tections [24] and is either unmoderated or has long aban-
doned by its owner. A popular and high-traffic wiki site,
for example, would not be a good storage site candidate
as it likely that non-malicious visitors would quickly no-
tice the changes made by Graffiti clients to store replica
data. With the rise of many open-source web-publishing
platforms, there are many potential targets that allow for
anonymous or semi-anonymous data posting. Notable ex-
amples include paste-bins, wiki sites, message boards, and
blogs. An HTML-based storage site also allows the data to
be disseminated to peers through disparate channels once it
is online, such as through Coral Cache [14] or Tor [13]. The
data embedded in the site’s pages could also be picked up
by search engine caching and archiving services for longer-
term storage.
Other potential storage sites include any photo and file
hosting sites that allow for automated data uploading. In
the case of the former, the data could also be hidden in-
side of image files using well-known techniques [21, 28].
As the Internet evolves, new targets will emerge that can
be incorporated into existing networks. The system could
also allow clients to use storage sites that are password pro-
tected for writing data, but where an account is not required
to read back the data. This obviates the need for a client to
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send the tracker account information, which could then be
used improperly by other clients to tamper with or destroy
the data.
Using involuntary web sites as storage dumps seems
counterintuitive if the main goal of the network is data
persistence and availability, since replicas are promptly re-
moved when site administrators and moderators discover
them. The Graffiti model overcomes this challenge and
takes advantage of “free network storage” through a mas-
sive replication and obfuscation process. It is not trivial,
however, to automatically store arbitrary data on random
web sites nor is it trivial to discover which sites are avail-
able with the properties stated above. The prevalence of
popular web publishing software means that one only needs
to target a small number of platforms in order to circum-
vent a large portion of the Internet. Furthermore, many
sites, such as wikis and message boards, often display the
network location of the user responsible for adding new
content or making changes to their pages, which makes it
difficult to deny responsibility for participating in illegal
activities. We argue that by fracturing a fileset’s replicas
across hundreds of storage sites, it is difficult to be fully
implicated when only a fraction of the evidence is avail-
able. A distributed effort to probe websites and uncover
open storage paths could allow peers to draw on a nearly
limitless pool of available storage.
4 Experimental Deployment
To determine whether the Graffiti Network model is a vi-
able and thus is a potential threat, we implemented a pro-
totype Graffiti tracker and client as an extension to the Bit-
Torrent protocol. We then stored a sample data set on a
large number of open sites and measured the availability of
our data for almost an entire year.
We built our system on top of the open-source libtor-
rent [5] BitTorrent library in order to allow clients to partic-
ipate in torrent swarms concurrently with Graffiti Network
activities. When enough peers are available, the client op-
erates strictly in BitTorrent mode. But if the number of dis-
tributed copies in the swarm drops below a threshold, the
client begins to contact the tracker using the Graffiti proto-
col in conjunction with its BitTorrent operations. As new
pieces are retrieved from storage sites, they are passed to
libtorrent’s storage manager for seeding to other peers.
4.1 Storage Site Discovery
In our experimental prototype, we target the open source
MediaWiki [3] platform as the potential storage site for
the network. Due to the popularity of sites like Wikipedia
that use MediaWiki, we believe that it is the most widely
deployed wiki platform with a large number of less-
experienced users that install the software without chang-
ing the permissive default settings. Another key character-
istic is that the MediaWiki platform maintains a complete
revision log for each article, which allows Graffiti peers to
retrieve data even if the changes are reversed or the content
Sites Found Sites Used
Anonymous Edits 8,483 3,161
Registration Protected 5,983 2,347
Puzzle Protected 1,157 138
CAPTCHA Protected 1,586 -
Not Publicly Modifiable 5,946 -
Total: 23,156 5,646
Table 1: The categories of protection used by the MediaWiki sites
discovered during the collection process and the sites used in the
experimental deployment.
is altered.
We decided to test our system on open MediaWiki sites
that we do not have control over as this allows us to best
measure whether our assumptions about how long the data
will remain on the sites are correct. We developed a dis-
tributed web crawler to discover MediaWiki installations
through search engines using keywords that are uniquely
indicative of a newly installed site. The crawler purposely
ignored well-known MediaWiki sites (e.g., those sites that
are part of the Wikipedia Foundation) and the commercial-
ized versions of MediaWiki (e.g., Wikia). For each site that
the crawler found, we probed it to determine what kind of
protection scheme it utilizes and the last time that it was
updated (see Table 1). Of the 23,156 unique MediaWiki
installations that we found, 8,483 sites allowed for anony-
mous editing and 5,983 allowed users to register accounts
without CAPTCHA or email protections in order to make
edits [24]. The default MediaWiki installation provides
a primitive arithmetic “puzzle” protection countermeasure
that we found in use on 1,157 sites; this puzzle is easily
broken with just a few lines of code, and thus did not pre-
vent our system from storing data on these sites. Lastly, in
order to minimize the impact of our experiments, we only
targeted those sites that had not been updated within the
last three months, thereby reducing our list to 5,646 sites;
lowering the threshold to two months would have yielded a
total of 11,987 potential storage sites.
The Graffiti client stores data on MediaWiki sites as
base64-encoded, Blowfish-encrypted blocks of text that are
written in a new article titled with a random word from the
dictionary. A more resilient approach would be to modify a
popular page on a given site, and then immediately reverse
the changes and mark the revision as vandalism. This has
two significant implications compared to writing data to a
newly created article. Foremost is that removing this data
completely from the page’s history requires administrators
to delete the entire page from the database and restore the
latest revision by hand, thereby losing all the previous legit-
imate revisions. Second, such an attack is more likely to be
overlooked by a site’s operators since they may only care
whether the changes were reversed. We deemed this tech-
nique too malevolent for the purpose of our experiments,
and thus chose to not implement it.
To retrieve a sub-piece stored on one of these storage
sites, the client downloads the web page and extracts the
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sponding storage site’s protection schemes.
text surrounded by the byte sequence markers provided by
the tracker. The client then reverses the base64 encoding,
decrypts the data, and verifies that it matches the checksum
provided by the tracker.
4.2 System Configuration
For our experimental deployment, we used a Linux ISO
split into 512KB pieces and 64KB sub-pieces as our sample
data file that the clients want to share. Even though we were
able to store up to 512KB payloads on a single MediaWiki
page, we choose to use a smaller sub-piece size. Again, an-
other more malicious approach would be to store a payload
with the size that can be uploaded and retrieved but causes
either a browser or the server to choke if the operator tries
to access the page through the MediaWiki administrative
interface. For example, we found that it was possible to
store 512KB pieces that would exhaust the default 20MB
memory limit of PHP if someone tried to remove the data.
Thus, the only way to remove the content is to execute the
proper SQL commands directly in the database, which is
likely too difficult for most users.
We initiated file sharing activity on April 10th, 2009 us-
ing a tracker and five clients deployed in our departmen-
tal lab. Each client connects to the tracker and produces a
full copy of a sub-piece on one of the 5,600+ MediaWiki
sites. We assume that all clients are truthful about whether
a replica is available and do not falsify replica URLs. We
instrumented the tracker to target each storage site only
once (although variations in sub-domains and URL rewrit-
ing led to some sites being used more than once).
Along with the data payload, at the top of each wiki
page we stored a small paragraph with an explanation of
the seemingly random text. This description also included
a unique tracking link back to our web page with fur-
ther information about the project. Tracking users’ click-
throughs from these links allows us to measure to some ex-
tent whether humans were actually discovering our payload
pages before they were deleted.
Once the clients pushed out all of the data to the sites, we
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their domain type: .com (42.5%), .edu (3.2%), .org (24.1%), US-
based other (14.0%), and Non-US-based other (16.1%).
then used a separate tool to check daily whether the data we
stored is still in place and has not been modified. We check
every replica regardless if it has not been available for some
time to ensure that the errors are not transient.
4.3 Results
We now report on the availability of the 5,646 replicas that
we stored in our experiments from April 10th to February
28th, 2010. For each missing replica, we categorize the
replica as (1) removed if the site is available but the orig-
inal page is missing, (2) changed if both the site and the
original page are available, but the data does not match our
stored checksum, or (3) not found if the site is no longer
available (e.g., the domain name has expired or MediaWiki
was uninstalled). Our investigation found that the missing
replicas were only either removed or not found; no replica
had its contents altered.
On the last day of our data collection, roughly 40% of
the replicas were still available and hosting the original data
that the prototype clients uploaded. The graph in Figure 2
shows a timeline of the percentage of replicas that are not
available on each day that we checked. The first notable
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data point is that an initial 20% of the replicas were re-
moved within the same week that they were created. The
rate in which sites are removed then tapers off as time pro-
gresses. We attribute this drop-off in activity to two possi-
ble reasons. Foremost is that by default any changes to a
MediaWiki site will appear on the first page of revision logs
for seven days after the revision is created, and thus our ac-
tions are more likely to be discovered soon after the data is
posted. The second possible reason is because a story about
our project appeared on the front page of a popular technol-
ogy news website on the third day of our experiment [2].
We believe that the “notoriety” of the project during this pe-
riod may have caused administrators to examine their web-
sites to see if they were targeted by our system. Once this
initial attention diminished, the slopes of the lines in Fig-
ure 2 decrease and it takes another 35 days before another
10% of the replicas are removed. After about 100 days,
the growth rate of replicas being removed (i.e., the lower
portion of the curve in Figure 2) tapers off and the num-
ber of sites that become unavailable begins to rise. This is
expected since many of the sites were not actively used by
their proprietor, and thus are taken down arbitrarily.
The graph in Figure 3 shows how the replicas were re-
moved over time in relation to their storage site’s protection
scheme. The salient aspect of the result is that initially sites
that employed some type of protection were faster to re-
move replicas. This is expected, since many of the sites that
employed some protection were still being used by users
despite having not been updated recently, whereas many of
the completely open sites still displayed the default Medi-
aWiki homepage message and thus were never even used
once they were installed. Such sites are likely long forgot-
ten by their owners who may never discover the replicas
once they pass the default seven day revision log window.
But after approximately 120 days, the percentage of miss-
ing replicas stored on sites allowing for anonymous edits
surpasses sites using the basic registration protection.
Lastly, the graph in Figure 4 charts the availability of
replicas with respect to the domain name of the storage site.
We attribute greater durability of data stored on .edu and
.org sites compared to other domains; such organizations
are likely to use open-source software for collaboration and
internal sites are often not behind corporate firewalls.
5 Discussion
The results presented in the previous section clearly
demonstrate the efficacy of the Graffiti Network model as
a means for facilitating longer-term file sharing. We there-
fore argue that the threat of such a system does indeed exist
and sites need to take measures to protect themselves from
being used in such a manner that we have describe.
5.1 Countermeasures
Much of the feedback that we received on the project was
from administrators that expressed their desire to provide
an open wiki site that allowed anonymous contributions,
despite the inevitable exposure to vandalism and spam. We
counter that such sites that do not want to require users to
register an account should still use CAPTCHA protections,
such as before a user is allowed to edit a page. In practice,
we found that the reCAPTCHA [31] project is the most ef-
fective protection as it does not require administrators to
install special server-side graphics libraries and strikes a
proper balance between availability and complexity. More
complex CAPTCHA schemes would not deter future Graf-
fiti clients that are able to solve CAPTCHAs (either manu-
ally or programmatically) and may only inhibit legitimate
visually impaired users. If sites wish to still remain open,
the CAPTCHA could be selectively enabled only when an
unverified user tries to post data larger than some low de-
fault threshold or creates too many new pages in a short
time span.
We also believe that other simple protection measures
could be included in popular web applications to prevent
abandoned or forgotten sites from being used for unin-
tended purposes. For example, MediaWiki’s default behav-
ior could be to lock down the editing features of a site after
a certain number of days if it was installed but then never
actually used. This approach is similar to the one used
by some blogging platforms to disable comments on older
posts. Administrators could easily re-enable this function-
ality by simply logging into the site again. Another tech-
nique is to use a page counter that is invoked on the client-
side (e.g., through JavaScript) and then compare the results
with server-side logs to determine whether there are an un-
usually large number of users accessing pages through a
non-browser client. Web application frameworks, such as
Ruby on Rails and Django, could also provide similar fea-
tures to protect custom-made sites.
5.2 Variations & Adaptations
Other than for P2P activities, the Graffiti model is also of
potential use for large-scale distributed systems used by
criminal organizations, often referred to as botnets. The
goal of most botnet operators is to gain access to a large
supply of computational resources for purposes of network
communication (e.g., sending emails or DOS attacks). If
these goals shift towards more data-centric activities, then
systems based on some of the principals of the Graffiti
Network model may become prevalent in order to store
large amounts of data for the botnet. Alternatively, instead
of storing replicated data, the commandeered storage sites
could also be used as a control channel for other entities in
the botnet.
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7 Conclusion
We have presented an overview of Graffiti Networks, a
new file sharing model that allows peers to subversively
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use third-party storage sites as an intermediary for trans-
ferring files between users. Our client-tracker paradigm is
similar to the BitTorrent protocol, but is designed to pro-
vide long term file availability to users while preserving
their anonymity. We do not intend the Graffiti model to
supplant BitTorrent networks, as it will never achieve the
same maximum network throughput nor will it ever be as
efficient. We believe, however, that our approach can have
a symbiotic relationship with existing deployments: peers
would use a Graffiti Network-like system to improve the
long term availability of shared files, while leveraging the
faster initial transfer rates of direct P2P communication for
data dissemination. We have implemented a prototype and
shown that data can be stored on publically accessible sites
for extended periods of time, beyond what is often possi-
ble in other existing peer-to-peer systems. After almost an
entire year, roughly 40% of the data that we stored on sites
that are not under our control was still available. These re-
sults indicate that malicious users may adopt the Graffiti
Network model, and thus site operators should take mea-
sures to prevent their sites from being used in this manner.
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